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INTRODUCTION
S
ince at least the 1996 Sustainable Fisheries Act amend-
ments to the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation
and Management Act,1 the United States has, at least
nominally, been pursuing a policy of sustainable management of
fisheries, guided by the precautionary principle. Nevertheless,
there is continued concern about the state of American fisheries.
As the Pew Oceans Commission pointed out in May 2003, we
are depleting the oceans of fish and have been for decades.
While we only know the status of one-third of the commercially
fished stocks in U.S. waters,
thirty percent of the fish popula-
tions that have been assessed are
overexploited to some degree.2
In its 2004 Final Report to Con-
gress and the President, the U.S.
Commission on Ocean Policy
expressed similar concerns in a
chapter devoted to the topic of
sustainable fisheries. Specifi-
cally, the Commission noted that
“the last thirty years have wit-
nessed overexploitation of many
fish stocks, degradation of habi-
tats, and negative consequences
for too many ecosystems and
fishing communities.”3
Chances are that the United
States’ actual attainment of sus-
tainable fisheries will involve the
increasing use of marine pro-
tected areas (“MPAs”) and
marine reserves. MPAs are loca-
tion-based legal protections for marine species and ecosystems
— the ocean equivalent of terrestrial national and state parks.
While all MPAs restrict some activities within their boundaries,
often through the use of marine zoning, the most protective
MPAs are marine reserves. Within the boundaries of a marine
reserve, usually all extractive uses of the marine ecosystem are
prohibited, including all fishing. Some marine reserves go fur-
ther and prohibit all access to the ecosystem except scientific
research, but most allow non-extractive recreational uses such as
snorkeling, diving, and boating.
Research has repeatedly demonstrated that MPAs and
marine reserves that are scientifically chosen to protect impor-
tant fish habitats, such as breeding grounds or nurseries, can be
quite effective in increasing both the numbers and size of tar-
geted species of fish.4 Size can be just as important as numbers
for the many species for which larger, older fish — the usual tar-
gets of commercial and recreational fishers — produce far more
gametes far more often than smaller fish. As the Pew Oceans
Commission summarized:
“Marine reserves — areas of the ocean in which all extrac-
tive and disruptive activities are prohibited — are a rela-
tively new, but very promising
approach to marine conserva-
tion . . . . The establishment of
areas that prohibit extractive and
disruptive activities, such as
wilderness areas, has been a
well-accepted conservation
practice on land for more than a
c e n t u r y  a n d  h a s  g r e a t l y
enhanced ecosystem protection.
While 4.6 percent of the land
area of the United States is pre-
served as wilderness, the area of
ocean under U.S. jurisdiction
that is protected in marine
reserves is a small fraction of
one percent.”5
Similarly, the U.S. Com-
mission on Ocean Policy linked
sustainable f isheries to the
increased use of MPAs and
ecosystem-based management.
It recommended that fisheries
managers increase the use of “essential fish habitat” designa-
tions on an ecosystem basis6 and that the federal government
“develop national goals and guidelines leading to a uniform
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process for the effective design, implementation, and evaluation
of marine protected areas.”7
Even accepting these general goals, the legal mechanism for
establishing a national system of MPAs and marine reserves
remains relatively unexamined. Currently, there are many legal
vehicles available to create an MPA or marine reserve, even just
within federal law. For example, MPAs can and have been cre-
ated through the Antiquities Act of 1906,8 the Marine Protection,
Research, and Sanctuaries Act (“MPRSA”),9 the Magnuson-
Stevens Act, direct congressional legislation,10 and presidential
executive order. In addition, coastal states can establish MPAs
and marine reserves in the first three nautical miles of the ocean
pursuant to a wide variety of state statutes. This variety of legal
vehicles gives credence to concerns that both the Pew Oceans
Commission and the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy raised
regarding the uncoordinated patchwork of laws and regulatory
programs that govern the nation’s oceans. However, differences
in these regulatory regimes, and in the MPAs and marine
reserves that result, can also suggest improvements in the law
that might better effectuate sustainable use of the nation’s marine
fisheries.
The Northwestern Hawaiian Islands provide one possible
testing ground for examining the many federal legal mecha-
nisms for creating MPAs and marine reserves. On June 15, 2006,
President Bush used the Antiquities Act to create the Northwest-
ern Hawaiian Islands Marine National Monument (“NWHI
Monument” or “Monument”).11 This new national monument
protects almost 140,000 square nautical miles of ocean around
the long chain of islands — almost 1400 miles long — that
stretches north and west of Kauai, the northernmost Hawaiian
island that tourists normally visit. The Monument is the largest
MPA in the world and protects the largest and arguably most
pristine and remote coral reef ecosystem in the world, which is
home to more than seven thousand marine species, twenty-five
percent of which are found nowhere else.
President Bush’s invocation of the Antiquities Act, however,
was the last in a series of federal legal actions to protect the
Northwestern Hawaiian Islands coral reef ecosystem. By invok-
ing the Antiquities Act, President Bush cut short the process of
designating the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands as a national
marine sanctuary pursuant to the MPRSA. The national marine
sanctuary designation process, in turn, was a response to Presi-
dent Clinton’s use of an executive order to create the Northwest-
ern Hawaiian Islands Coral Reef Ecosystem Reserve (“NWHI
Reserve” or “Reserve”), which was itself in tension with both
the Western Pacific Fishery Management Council’s (“West-
Pac’s”) fisheries management planning pursuant to the Magnu-
son-Stevens Act and, at least for a while, the State of Hawaii’s
management efforts pursuant to state law.
PROTECTING THE NORTHWESTERN HAWAIIAN
ISLANDS AS AN MPA: CHOICE OF LEGAL VEHICLE
JURISDICTION OVER THE NORTHWESTERN
HAWAIIAN ISLANDS
Under the third United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (“UNCLOS III”),12 which entered into force on Novem-
ber 16, 1994, coastal nations can assert various levels of regula-
tory authority over four zones of the ocean. The twelve nautical
miles of ocean closest to shore are the territorial sea, in which
the coastal nation may exercise sovereign control over the
waters, the airspace, the seabed, and the subsoil. The next twelve
nautical miles of ocean (twelve to twenty-four nautical miles out
The Northwestern Hawaiian Islands Marine National Monument.
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to sea) are the contiguous zone, which coastal nations can use to
enforce laws relating to activities in the territorial sea or on
shore. A nation’s exclusive economic zone (“EEZ”) can extend
up to two hundred nautical miles from shore. In its EEZ, the
coastal nation has sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve,
and manage the sea’s natural resources, “whether living or non-
living,” in the waters, seabed, and subsoil.13 Finally, coastal
nations can exercise regulatory control over the continental
shelf, particularly for energy development purposes.
The United States is not a party to UNCLOS III. However, it
views most of the jurisdictional provisions of UNCLOS III as
customary international law and has asserted conforming claims
of jurisdictional authority over all four zones. Thus, as a practi-
cal matter, the United States regulates marine fisheries out to two
hundred nautical miles from its shores. Given the United States’
relatively long and unshared coastlines and its territorial hold-
ings in the Pacific and Caribbean, this assertion of jurisdiction
means that the United States regulates more square miles of
ocean than it does of land.
Nevertheless, while, as a
nation, the United States asserts
jurisdiction over two hundred
nautical miles of ocean extend-
ing from its shores, generally
only the outermost 197 nautical
miles are purely federal waters.
In 1947, the U.S. Supreme Court
declared all marine waters under
U.S. jurisdiction to be federal.14
However, six years later, Con-
gress “restored” title to the first
three nautical miles of ocean to
the states through the Sub-
merged Lands Act of 1953.15 In
addition, the Submerged Lands
Act allowed states to assert
claims to more than the standard
three nautical miles, based on historical control. While most of
such claims have been unsuccessful, Texas and Florida both
established that their sovereign rights extend three marine
leagues (about nine nautical miles) into the Gulf of Mexico.
Title to submerged lands gives the states authority to regu-
late the waters above those lands. However, states’ regulation of
the three nautical miles of ocean closest to shore remains sub-
ject, under both the Submerged Lands Act and the Supremacy
Clause, to the federal government’s authority to regulate for
“commerce, navigation, national defense, and international
affairs.”16 Thus, with respect to the Northwestern Hawaiian
Islands, the State of Hawaii generally has primary authority to
regulate the three-nautical-mile “donut” of ocean water sur-
rounding each island (Midway Island is an exception). The rest
of the waters surrounding this island chain are purely federal.
FEDERAL LEGAL INSTRUMENTS FOR SETTING ASIDE
THE NORTHWESTERN HAWAIIAN ISLANDS AS AN MPA
The Northwestern Hawaiian Islands have long attracted fed-
eral attention. In 1909, President Theodore Roosevelt, acting
through executive order, reserved all of the Northwestern Hawai-
ian Islands except Midway “for the use of the Department of
Agriculture as a preserve and breeding ground for native
birds.”17 This reservation eventually became the Hawaiian
Islands National Wildlife Refuge, and in 1988 the Refuge’s pro-
tections were extended to the area’s coral reefs and the marine
life found in and around them.
The Clinton Executive Orders
In 1998, President Clinton issued the Coral Reef Protection
Executive Order18 to preserve the biodiversity and other values
of the United States’ coral reef ecosystems. The Order makes
federal agencies directly responsible for protecting coral reefs
and their associated ecosystems, and it created the Coral Reef
Task Force. In March 2000, the Clinton Administration adopted
the Coral Reef Task Force’s National Plan to Conserve Coral
Reefs. A key component of this plan was to set aside twenty per-
cent of the existing coral reef MPAs as no-take fisheries reserves
(also referred to as “marine wilderness areas”).
On May 26, 2000, President
Clinton signed the Marine Pro-
tected Areas Executive Order.19
The Order seeks to establish a
national system of MPAs by
l inking  MPAs and  mar ine
reserves established under fed-
eral, state, territorial, tribal, or
local law. President George W.
Bush adopted this Executive
Order in June 2001. The
National Oceanic and Atmos-
pheric Administration (“NOAA”)
is currently implementing the
Executive Order through the
National Marine Protected
Areas Center. In November
2004, the MPA Center issued its
Strategic Plan for working toward “a cohesive and integrated
system of MPAs.” 
The designation of the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands
Coral Reef Ecosystem Reserve came about through an unusual
blending of congressional and presidential action. In November
2000, through the National Marine Sanctuary Amendments Act
of 2000, Congress authorized President Clinton, in consultation
with the Governor of Hawaii, to “designate any Northwestern
Hawaiian Islands coral reef or coral reef ecosystem as a coral
reef reserve to be managed by the Secretary of Commerce.”20
President Clinton exercised this authority in Executive Order
No. 13178,21 establishing the NWHI Reserve. This Reserve set
aside an area 1200 nautical miles long by one hundred nautical
miles wide, protecting seventy percent of the nation’s coral reefs.
President Clinton ordered the Reserve to be managed pursuant
to a precautionary approach that favored resource protection
when information was lacking. The Order also called for the use
of marine zoning, including the establishment of marine reserves
Once an area is designated
as a National Marine
Sanctuary, no one can use
or remove sanctuary
resources except in
accordance with 
federal law.
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(“Reserve Preservation Areas”), and for restoration of degraded
portions of the reef. Finally, the Order capped all fishing in the
Reserve at the currently existing levels.
The problem with the NWHI Reserve Executive Order was
that Congress did not permanently eliminate other sources of
legal authority that could apply in the Northwestern Hawaiian
Islands. The flimsiness of President Clinton’s legal authority to
establish the Reserve is evidenced by the fact that, in an appro-
priations act, Congress demanded “adequate review and com-
ment” before the Reserve Preservation Areas could become
permanent. The Secretary of Commerce held seven public hear-
ings on the executive order’s proposal, allowing President Clin-
ton to issue a final NWHI Reserve Executive Order on January
18, 2001,22 three days before he left office.
The Magnuson-Stevens Act
The legal authority of the NWHI Reserve Executive Orders
remained questionable, especially in light of the authority given
to NOAA and WestPac pursuant to the Magnuson-Stevens Act.
This Act establishes “[a] national program for the conservation
and management of the fisheries resources in the United States”
in order “to prevent overfishing, to rebuild overfished fish stocks,
to ensure conservation, and to realize the full potential of the
Nation’s fishery resources”23 Moreover, as noted, when Con-
gress amended the Magnuson-Stevens Act through the 1996
Sustainable Fisheries Act, it incorporated both a precautionary
approach to and a sustainable development goal for the country’s
fisheries management. 
Pursuant to the 1996 amendments, the regional Fisheries
Management Councils have begun to experiment with an
ecosystem approach to fisheries management, including the use
of zoning and MPAs. For example, on June 28, 2006, NOAA
Fisheries used its authority under the Magnuson-Stevens Act to
amend five fishery management plans for Alaska fisheries to
prohibit trawling in 370,000 square miles of Alaska waters. This
regulation, which became effective July 28, 2006, effectively
created two MPAs — a 320,000-square-mile area in the Aleutian
Islands and a 50,000-square-mile area in the Gulf of Alaska —
for Alaska’s cold-water coral gardens, one of the rarest marine
ecosystems in the world. More recently, the Pacific Fishery Man-
agement Council has used its authority under the Magnuson-
Stevens Act to create marine reserves off the California coast,
especially in connection with the Channel Islands National
Marine Sanctuary. 
Nevertheless, nothing in the Magnuson-Stevens Act vali-
dates the establishment of the NWHI Reserve or required
NOAA and WestPac to respect the Reserve Protected Area des-
ignations. In fact, under this Act, NOAA and WestPac remained
legally free to choose to impose fishing regimes for the North-
western Hawaiian Islands that would contradict the Reserve Pro-
tected Area designations. 
Indeed, conflicts did arise. In December 2000, WestPac pub-
lished its ecosystem-based Draft Fishery Management Plan for
the Coral Reef Ecosystems of the Western Pacific Region. It
received several comments adamantly opposing the creation of
MPAs, and especially no-take marine reserves, in the Northwest-
ern Hawaiian Islands, despite the fact that federally regulated
fishing there was already fairly limited. Yet, when WestPac
issued the final version of this fishery management plan in Octo-
ber 2001, it did preserve the concept of no-take marine reserves.
However, the marine reserve boundaries in the fishery manage-
ment plan differed from those President Clinton had designated
within the NWHI Reserve, leaving the executive order more pro-
tective of the coral reefs than WestPac allowed pursuant to the
Magnuson-Stevens Act. 
Incoming President George W. Bush took about a year to
accept President Clinton’s NWHI Reserve Executive Orders,
rendering the Reserve’s status even more legally ambiguous.
Moreover, after the change in administration, WestPac more
actively opposed the NWHI Reserve’s Reserve Protection Areas
and their prohibitions on fishing, proposing instead to allow har-
vesting of lobsters and precious coral.
Similarly, into mid-2001, Hawaiians continued to express
concern about the fishing limitations in the NWHI Reserve.
Indeed, the Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources
was reluctant to commit to MPA and marine reserve protections
in the Hawaiian state waters surrounding each island. Its January
2002 draft management plan for these waters was far less protec-
tive, and far more permissive of fishing, than President Clinton’s
executive order for the federal waters in the Reserve.
The Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries 
Act of 1972
The national marine sanctuaries provisions of the MPRSA
allow the Secretary of Commerce, acting through NOAA, to
designate “any discrete area of the marine environment” as a
National Marine Sanctuary if NOAA makes certain findings.24
Specifically, NOAA must find that: (1) the area is of special
national significance; (2) the area needs protection; and (3) the
area is manageable. Thirteen National Marine Sanctuaries cur-
rently exist, protecting more than 18,000 square miles of ocean.
In addition, in January 2006, Governor Ted Kulongoski of Ore-
gon proposed a new Oregon Coast National Marine Sanctuary.
Once an area is designated as a National Marine Sanctuary,
no one can use or remove sanctuary resources except in accor-
dance with federal law. Thus, National Marine Sanctuaries are
MPAs. However, historically, very few National Marine Sanctu-
aries have included marine reserves because the MPRSA
emphatically encourages multiple uses of these sanctuaries.
Nevertheless, some of the National Marine Sanctuaries are
experimenting with the use of marine reserves. The designation
of the Dry Tortugas Ecological Reserve in the Florida Keys
National Marine Sanctuary is probably the most famous exam-
ple of a marine reserve negotiation. In addition, the Channel
Islands National Marine Sanctuary, off the coast of southern
California, has been pursuing a multi-year plan to establish
marine reserves within the sanctuary.
Spurred by President Clinton’s final NWHI Reserve Execu-
tive Order, NOAA announced on January 19, 2001, that it
intended to designate the Reserve as a national marine sanctuary.
As a result of the Bush Administration’s reconsideration, how-
ever, NOAA did not begin the scoping process for the sanctuary
31 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY
until March 2002, and then, because of high levels of public
interest, it extended that process twice. Designation of the
national marine sanctuary also required the issuance of a fishery
management plan pursuant to the Magnuson-Stevens Act and a
full environmental impact statement (“EIS”) pursuant to the
National Environmental Policy Act.25 Partially as a result of
these and the MPRSA’s procedural requirements, NOAA antici-
pated from the beginning that sanctuary designation would take
two to three years. 
Even so, it is fair to say that the sanctuary designation
process effectively stalled out. As late as May 2006, NOAA was
still working on the draft EIS for the proposed sanctuary,26 and
management of the NWHI Reserve was still proceeding through
the uneasy double authorities of President Clinton’s executive
order and WestPac’s implementation of the Magnuson-Stevens
Act.27 This four-year delay helps to explain why President Bush
reached for the Antiquities Act.
The Antiquities Act/Act of June 8, 1906
The Antiquities Act is very short. Under it, the President of
the United States is “authorized, in his discretion, to declare by
public proclamation historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric
structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest that
are situated upon the lands owned or controlled by the Govern-
ment of the United States to be national monuments.”28 More-
over, while the Antiquities Act has a predominantly terrestrial
focus, Presidents have repeatedly used it to create marine-related
national monuments that function as MPAs, such as the Buck
Island Reef National Monument in the Virgin Islands and the
California Coastal National Monument along most of the coast
of California.
President Bush’s proclamation29 establishing the North-
western Hawaiian Islands Marine National Monument is very
protective of the area. Virtually all activities within the Monu-
ment are subject to regulation by the Secretaries of Commerce
(water) and the Interior (land), and the proclamation imposes a
vessel monitoring requirement as well. All commercial fishing is
to be phased out over five years, with the lobster fishery immedi-
ately subject to an annual catch limit of zero. Oil and gas explo-
ration and development, vessel anchoring, and introductions of
invasive species are absolutely prohibited. In addition, the Secre-
taries cannot permit any activity within the Monument unless
the activity meets ten ecosystem-preserving criteria. For exam-
ple, recreational snorkeling and diving are prohibited in the Spe-
cial Preservation Areas and Midway Atoll Special Management
Area. Thus, effectively, most of the NWHI Monument is or will
become a marine reserve, the largest such reserve on the planet.
CONCLUSION
The Northwestern Hawaiian Islands’ history as an MPA
strongly suggests that pure presidential authority is a more effi-
cient vehicle for establishing MPAs, especially marine reserves.
Even at the executive order stage, President Clinton accom-
plished far more through the NWHI Reserve Executive Order
than NOAA managed in five years of the national marine sanctu-
ary designation process. As noted, however, executive orders
lack comprehensive legislative backing and authority, leading to
potential conflicts with other marine regulatory programs, such
as those established under the Magnuson-Stevens Act.
In contrast, the Antiquities Act gives the President this exec-
utive authority with full legislative backing, an improvement
over the use of executive orders. It also appears to have two
advantages over the MPRSA. First, the Antiquities Act has the
advantage of speed of designation. As soon as President Bush
declared the NWHI Monument established on June 15, 2006, the
Monument existed. In addition, NOAA — undoubtedly aided by
the prior existence of the NWHI Reserve and the national
marine sanctuary process — issued its final regulations for the
national monument just two months later.30
Second, the legal protections for a marine national monu-
ment are potentially much greater than those for a national
marine sanctuary. As noted, the MPRSA promotes a philosophy
of multiple use regulation of national marine sanctuaries. In con-
trast, the Antiquities Act inspires a preservationist philosophy, as
President Bush’s proclamation setting aside the NWHI Monu-
ment attests.
Congress is currently debating whether and how to imple-
ment the many recommendations of the Pew Oceans Commis-
sion and the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy. The history of
the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands suggests that if Congress
decides to vigorously pursue the Commissions’ recommendation
to increase the use of MPAs and marine reserves to preserve and
restore fisheries and to protect marine ecosystems in general, it
should seriously consider modeling at least one part of any new
federal MPA legislation on the Antiquities Act and giving the
president considerable direct authority to establish MPAs and
marine reserves. 
Of course, to create a coherent national system, Congress
may want to constrain presidential authority in some way — for
example, by limiting presidential designation authority to rec-
ommendations of an expert agency or panel. Nevertheless, this
constrained authority would still be more likely to produce a
functional national system of MPAs and marine reserves —
especially if joined to a streamlined agency designation process
— than the multi-use, multi-agency, multi-analysis national
marine sanctuary regulatory regime.
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